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ABSTRACT 
Many charitable organisations do not produce commercially viable outputs and, 
consequently, rely heavily on private donations. As they operate in an increasingly 
competitive environment for donations and grants, organisational sustainability is 
increasingly a critical issue.  
 
Empirical results explaining levels of private donations to individual charities are 
presented and are consistent with a Cournot oligopolistic structure in the competition 
for private donations. Thus, the level of donations increases with an organisation’s 
level of fundraising expenditure, but the effect of inter-charity competition for grants 
reduces individual levels.  Other influences on donations are volunteer numbers, 
government grants and organisational size and administrative expenditure.  
 
Keywords: Non-profit; Cournot theory, organisational sustainability; public goods; 
private goods; provision; replacing government; volunteers. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper represents part of a wider study and focuses on one economic model to 
gain some insight into the sustainability of charitable organisations which depend to 
varying degrees on public fundraising. 
 
There are three main elements involved in corporate suitability including the 
economic, environment and social aspects which are known as a triple-bottom line 
(Elikington 1997). For charitable and philanthropic organisations, sustainability can 
be defined as how to ensure their continuity of services to community 
(Weerawandena, McDonald & Sullivan 2010). The many recent global humanitarian 
crises have attracted greater attention to the charitable sector. An increasing number 
of charitable organisations are, therefore, seeking donations from a broader section of 
the community (Salamon, Hems & Chinnock 2000).  
 
The major problem of sustainability for most charities and philanthropic organisations 
is that they do not produce commercial outputs. Those charitable organisations that do 
produce a saleable commodity (e.g. sports clubs, stock exchanges, insurance clubs and 
community banks), frequently convert to for-profit organisations. Those that cannot or 
do not produce saleable commodities nevertheless provide vital services such as 
disaster, family welfare and counselling, and emergency relief (Chetkovich & 
Frumkin 2003). They provide both public and private goods that caring societies 
desire, but have difficulties in sustaining themselves. Charitable organisations may 
rely heavily on donations and carry out fundraising as a source of income. They 
operate in an increasingly competitive context where being sustainable has emerged 
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as a critical issue (Chetkovich & Frumkin 2003). However, sustainability studies are 
virtually absent in the charitable sector (excluding governments) (Weerawandena et 
al. 2010). It is believed that this is either the first or one of the first studies of 
economic sustainability of charitable organisations.  
 
This issue is further compounded by the existence of competition for funds among 
charities operating in the same areas. It is argued that competition for funds 
diminishes sustainability (Weerawandena et al. 2010) . This article, therefore, 
attempts to investigate research questions of what effect fundraising activities have on 
competition of charitable organisations for donations, using the data from samples of 
Australian charitable organisations. In view of both the growth and the significance of 
the charity sector, there is a need to understand the role of competition between 
charitable organisations (Parsons 2003), using empirical models of this competition.   
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Recent research has found that market competition for donations is a primary 
instrument for charitable organisation to achieve more disciplined operations. 
(Glaeser 2003; Thornton & Belski 2009). Yet, it is not clear how donor markets might 
be influenced by variation in organisational efficiency. Employing the modified 
Cournot theory of oligopolistic competition markets, this study attempts to construct 
theoretically and empirical models.  
 
Donors value the services of charitable organisations and so wish to provide 
donations. But in reality, charitable organisations usually have preferences about 
administrative expenses and costs of program services. If we assume an organisation 
is a purely altruistic charitable organisation, it will only be interested in maximising 
the utility for recipients (Roberts 1984). However, charitable organisations consist of 
incompletely altruistic individuals (members, employees and donors). Therefore, each 
charitable organisation may have different preferences for allocations to 
administrative expenses and program services. These preferences, as shown in 
financial accounts, may influence donations (Andreoni & Petrie 2004; Gordon & 
Khumawala 1999). 
 
Consider charitable organisations in a market with N organisations. Assume the 
number and size of charitable organisations serves as the index of the degree of 
competition, and as the number of charitable organisations increases, the market is 
considered more competitive. Each charitable organisation produces a service to 
recipients (P) which is valued by potential donors. Thus, the charitable organisations 
compete for donations via: (i) fundraising expenditures and (ii) the level of donations 
going to recipients. Fundraising expenditures are assumed to either inform, induce or 
enhance the utility donors obtain from the output of the charitable organisation. Of 
course, increased fundraising expenditures reduce the resources available for program 
services.  
 
Donations are used to cover expenditures on program services (PE), administration 
costs (AC), fundraising expenditure (F), and other expenditures (OE). Each charitable 
organisation operates under the non-distribution of surplus constraint as follows 
     PE + AC + F +OE = D                                                                                           (1) 
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Donors derive utility from the services (Pi) of the charitable organisations. However, 
the utility derived from the services of a particular charitable organisation may 
increase with fundraising expenditures. Thus, if fundraising expenditures enhance the 
services of the charitable organisation or provide other services to donors, then 
fundraising expenditures impact directly upon the utility function of donors. However, 
if fundraising expenditure is treated as being for the purpose of advertising, providing 
information about the existence and nature of the organisation, they do not enter 
directly into the utility function of donors. It is assumed that the services provided to 
recipients are identical for all charitable organisations in a given group, so that the 
non-differentiated product oligopoly model is appropriate.  
 
Competition period: In a given time period, the charitable organisations choose the 
portion of donations (Fi) for fundraising expenditures to raise total donations. 
Donations period: Then, the donors observe the choices of the Charitable 
Organisations and choose an allocation of donations (D1,...,DN). Ratio of competitors: 
Assuming the CO’s fundraising activities/expenditure has an effect on donations, then 
its donations may be affected by competitors’ fundraising activities/expenditures or 
the fraction of its fundraising expenditures to total competitors’ fundraising 
expenditures. Relative size effect: Charitable organisations’ size/age are considered as 
a stock of quality of charitable organisations. Grouping: Charitable organisations 
compete with similar service providers of charitable organisations, or charitable 
organisations in the same location area (grouping allocation).  
 
Consider two charities competing for donations as well as each output to recipients: 
  
         (Ri , Rj), and Ri = F(Rj) and Rj = G(Ri).  
  
       where: i = charitable organisation i; j = competing charitable organisation j;  
                  R = output to recipient; F and G = function.  
 
The characteristics of these charities may be considered as either: 
 
(i) Cooperating with each other as a monopoly. The optimum of utility MaxUR is  
     where F is optimum F = Fi + Fj;  
(ii) Competing with each other, which shows two charities as duopoly organisations.  
 
We assume that charitable organisation i’s total donation is affected by its own 
fundraising expenditures at competition period and donation period, when fundraising 
activities are taking place; and competitors’ fundraising activities and ratio of 
competitors’ fundraising expenditures on its own fundraising expenditure are also 
influenced at the same time. However, as discussed above, the charitable organisation 
i’s size (fixed assets), age, volunteers, administration costs, government grants and the 
relative effect of competitors’ size on its own size may have an effect on the previous 
period. Consistent with previous studies, a log-log form of the model is used (Jacobs 
& Marudas 2009).  
 
The parameter estimates from testing a log-log model are interpreted as elasticities; 
i.e., the percentage change in the dependent variable associated with a one percent 
change in the independent variable. The initial empirical model tested was Model 1: 
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ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fit/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1    
          + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + ε                   (Model 1) 
 
where: i = a charitable organisation; j = competing charitable organisations; t = the   
year; D = donations; F = fundraising expenditures; Fi /F = the ratio of Fi to F; A = 
fixed assets; Ai /A = the ratio of Ai to A; V = the number of volunteers; Age = 
organisational age; and ε = the error term. 
 
The dependent variable is total private donations. The major independent variable of 
interest is F, fundraising expenditures, as the more a charitable organisation spends on 
fundraising activities, the more donations the charitable organisation should receive. 
Also of major interest is A, fixed assets at the end of the year. This can be a measure 
of organisational wealth and that the wealthier an organisation is the less it needs 
additional donations, suggesting a negative relation between years of assets and 
donations (Marudas & Jacobs 2004).  
 
Figure 1 presents the summary of research questions, testable hypotheses and 
empirical models.  
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Figure 1: Research topics, questions, hypotheses and models of the research 
  
Research Topic 
Fundraising activities of charitable organisations (COs) in Australia 
(Including competition for donation between charitable organisations) 
DRQ2-1: How does 
competition between 
COs affect effectiveness 
of fundraising? 
DRQ2-2: What 
characteristics of COs 
affect fundraising? 
DRQ2-3: What other 
factors of COs affect 
fundraising?  
H1  
H0: Fi = 0 
H1: Fi > 0 
 
H4 & H7                  H5 
H0: Ai = 0 
H1: Ai > 0  
H0: Agei = 0 
H1: Agei > 0  
H0: Ai /A = 0 
(Ai/Aj = 0)  
H1: Ai /A> 0  
(Ai /Aj> 0) 
      
H6                    H8 &H9 
H0: Vi = 0 
H1: Vi > 0  
 
H0: Gi = 0 
H1: Gi > 0  
H0: ACi =0 
H1: ACj >0 
Research Questions 
Indirect Research Question (IRQ): 
Are COs altruistic? 
DRQ 1: (How) Do COs 
maximise private donations 
(non-government grants)?  
DRQ 2: Does competition 
between COs for donations 
affect donor behaviour and 
donations?
H1&H2                  H3 
H0: Fi = 0 
H1: Fi >0  
H0:Fj = 0 
H1: Fj < 0 
 
H0: Fi /F= 0   
(Fi /Fj =0) 
H1: Fi /F> 0  
(Fi /Fj >0) 
 
Direct Research Question (DRQ): 
What determines the level of 
fundraising expenditures and the 
level of donations raised by COs?  
where: M = ordinary least squared (OLS) model (M1-4) for hypotheses (H) 1-9 testing; 
i = charitable organisation (CO) i;  j =competitor CO to CO i;  
F = fundraising expenditures; A = fixed assets (a proxy of size);  
Age = number of years since the CO i was formally created (operational age);  
V = number of persons per year working as volunteers;  
G = government subsidies/grants; AC = Administrative costs 
 
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4
OLS 
M1, M2, M3, M4
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METHODOLOGY   
The formation of each modified model is explained.   
 
Creating a family of models  
All of the models in this section are modifications of Model 1. As shown in Figure 2, 
a family of empirical models, in the first row there are four models, Model 1 to 4. 
Models 2 to 4 are modified from Model 1. For example, a modification for Model 2 is 
created by including an additional variable, Government Grants (G), on Model 1. A 
modification for Model 3 is created by including an additional variable, 
Administrative Costs (AC), on Model 1. Model 4 is created by excluding a variable, 
Organisational Age (Age) and including an additional variable, Government Grants 
(G).  
 
Each Model 1 to 4 is divided into three major family or two minor family models. 
Major family models, 1 to 4 consist of a combination of lagged and unlagged 
independent variables, whereas minor family models, 1 to 4 are formed by either 
lagged independent variables only (Minor Family 1) or unlagged independent 
variables only (Minor Family 2). Major family models are labelled as Models 1 to 4. 
Minor family models employ either lagged independent variables only (minor family 
1) or unlagged independent variables only (minor family 2, labelled as U). Models of 
minor family 1 are labelled L for sub-division of Models 1 to 4 (i.e. Model 1_L), 
whereas models of minor family 2 are labelled U for sub-division of Models 1 to 4 
(i.e. Model 1_U). 
 
Furthermore, major or minor models are each divided into two groups in relation to 
calculation of the ratio, either using denominator as total value of competing charities 
or the value of competing charities j. Figure 2 presents a family of empirical models, 
in the third row there are the first and the second box (1 or 2. 3 or 4, 5 or 6). Each of 
the first family models in the first boxes (1, 3 or 5) in the third row use the total value 
of all competing charities as the denominator in the calculation of the ratios (i.e., ln Fi 
/ Σln F or ln Ai / Σln A), whereas the second family models in the second boxes (2, 4 
and 6) use the value of competing charity j as the denominator in the calculation of 
the ratios (i.e., ln Fi / Σln Fj or ln Ai / Σln Aj). The latter models are labelled j as an 
addition of sub-modified Models 1 to 4 (i.e., Model 1_J or Model 1_LJ or Model 
1_UJ). The amounts of competing charities j are calculated from the total value of 
competing charities minus the amount of charity i (ΣlnFj = ΣlnF–lnFi and ΣlnAj = 
ΣlnA–lnAi).  
 
DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION  
This study uses, as its sample data, the financial and non-financial variables obtained 
from the annual reports of 44 charitable organisations, which operated in Australia for 
the eight financial years from 2001 to 2008.  
 
The choice of the eight year time period provides scope for the inclusion of data that 
is both representative and avoids distortion. With respect to the eight year time period 
selected from 2001, the Australian Government has required Australian charitable 
organisations to disclose their annual reports since that date. This allows this study to 
employ full data sets from 2001. The charitable organisations were selected from the 
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Business Review Weekly’s (BRW) ‘Top 200 Charitable Organisations’ list, as at July 
2006 (BRW 2006)1.  
 
Descriptive statistics on data were examined, followed by a correlation matrix which 
discloses the general factorability (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). Second, the data are 
checked for normal distribution. If the variables are normally distributed, the solution 
is enhanced (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). However, the logarithm transformation for 
variables is to reduce the impact of outliers but it is necessary to check whether the 
variable gives a normal or near-normal distribution after the transformation of the data 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2001,p.81). Thirdly, the outliers in the variables act as an 
influence on the factor solution. Univariate outliers are examined using the scatter plot 
and the histogram graphically, or testing from a standardised score of z scores on one 
or more variables, to see if it is in excess of 3.29 (p<0.001, two-tailed test) 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). If outliers are detected, the data is eliminated after 
checking the accuracy of the data entry. In addition, the Mahalanobis Distance (MD) 
measurement is used to determine the outliers (Gujarati 1995).  
 
Finally, heteroscedasticity is tested using the ‘Newey-West test’ (1987, 1994). In 
regression analysis, the variance of the dependent variable is assumed to be the equal 
variance across the data (homogeneity of variance) (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). The 
results of the “White test” are evaluated for the null hypothesis of heteroscedasticity 
in the residuals with F-statistic in p-value. This ‘Newey-West test’ also allows the 
results of heteroscedasticity to be adjusted using the weighted least squares (Norusis 
1993). 
 
 
                                                 
1 A list of the organisations is available from the principal author.   
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Figure 2: A family of empirical models 
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Note: M1, M2, M3, M4 are family models. M1 is basic model and M2, M3 and M4 are constructed from M1. M2 contains an additional variable to M1, 
Government Grants, G. M3 contains an additional variable, Administrative Costs, AC. M4 has an additional variable G, but not Age. Major family models use 
combining lagged and unlagged values for independent variables [fundraising expenditure related variables are unlagged (lnFi, lnFj and lnFi/lnF) and others are 
lagged]. Minor family models are either all lagged (L) (minor family 1) or unlagged (U) (minor family 2) for independent variables. The ratios to competitors are 
employed in two ways to compute competitors: 1. all competitors, F (or A); or 2. competing charities J (Fj or Aj), computed from all competitors minus i, (Fj=F–
Fi or Aj = A–Ai). 
Empirical models  
M1, M2, M3, M4 
Major Family 
Lagged and unlagged  
Minor Family 1 
Lagged 
Minor Family 2 
Unlagged 
3. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors 
lnFi/ΣlnF
4. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors 
lnFi /ΣlnFj
1. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors 
lnFi/ΣlnF
2. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors 
lnFi /ΣlnFj
5. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors’ 
lnFi/ΣlnF
6. Ratio of lnFi 
to competitors 
lnFi /ΣlnFj
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Dependent and Independent Variables  
OLS regression analyses are conducted using the natural logarithm on total donations as 
the dependent variable (lnDit). Based upon theoretical and empirical modelling, the 
following variables are included as independent variables in the models and they are all 
transformed to a logarithm and are employed in these previous studies: Fundraising 
expenditures (F) (Gordon & Khumawala 1999; Tinkelman 2004; Weisbrod & 
Dominquez 1986); Administration Costs (AC) (Castaneda, Garen & Thornton 2007); 
Fixed Assets (A) (Rose-Ackerman 1996; Tinkelman 1999, 2002); Organisational age 
(Age) ((Khanna & Sandler 2000; Parsons & Trussel 2003; 2008; Posnett & Sandler 
1989; Tinkelman 1999; Weisbrod & Dominquez 1986);The number of volunteers (V): 
(Bekkers & Graaf 2005; Callen 1994; Gidron 1983; Gittell & Tebaldi 2006; Smith 
1983; Unger 1991); and Government grants (G): Charitable organisations compete for 
receiving government subsidies (Marcuello & Salas 2001). Some previous studies find 
that government grants encourage private donors to donate more (Andreoni 1990; 
Khanna & Sandler 2000; Kingma 1989; Payne 1998; Roberts 1984; Warr 1982) and 
others have found that government subsidies discourage private giving (Kingma 1989; 
Payne 1998; Roberts 1984; Warr 1982), or that any increased government assistance 
can partially reduce private donations (Schokkaert & Ootegem 1998).  
 
Table 1: Research variables and summary definitions 
Variables Definitions 
lnDi The natural logarithm of private donations (current dollars) to charitable 
organisation (CO) i  
lnFi The natural logarithm of fundraising expenditures of COi 
lnFj The natural logarithm of fundraising expenditures of COi’s competitor 
COj, (Total fundraising expenditures in a group (F) – Fi). This value 
will vary between groups. 
lnFi/∑lnF The natural logarithm of ratio Fi to all competitors’ F. This value will 
vary between groups.  
lnFi/lnFj The natural logarithm of ratio Fi to competitors’ Fj, (alternative ratio to  
lnFi /∑lnF). This value will vary between groups.  
lnAi The natural logarithm of fixed assets of COi; used a proxy for the size 
and wealth of CO. 
lnAi/∑lnA The natural logarithm of ratio Ai to all competitors ‘A. This value will 
vary between groups. 
lnAi/lnAj The natural logarithm of ratio Ai to competitor’s Aj (alternative ratio to 
lnAi/∑lnA). This value will vary between groups. 
lnVi The natural logarithm of number of persons per year working as 
volunteers for COi. 
lnAgei The natural logarithm of number of years since the COi was formally 
created (operational age). 
lnGi The natural logarithm of government subsidies/grants to COi.  
lnACi The natural logarithm of administrative costs of COi. 
NOTE: All variables are represented in number or monetary value for a financial year.   
 
One major difference between the present study and the most similar of previous studies 
(Castaneda et al. 2007; Posnett & Sandler 1989) is that they employed the fundraising 
competition index variables. Such aggregation would be fatal to the present study, since 
it would render meaningless the competition variables, which should vary between like 
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charity groups. The competition variables are competitors’ fundraising expenditure, Fj, 
and the ratio of fundraising expenditures to all competitors, Fi/F or Fi/Fj and ratio of 
organisational size to all competitors’ size. The difference between Fi/F and Fi/Fj, or 
Ai/A and Ai/Aj is whether the denominator value includes the value of the charitable 
organisation in the former (Fi/F and Ai/A) or excludes it in the latter (Fi/Fj and Ai/A). 
These values are not different from each other when the group is large, but when the 
group is small, their differences would be large and so would affect results. The reason 
for using different denominators is to determine whether the empirical results are 
sensitive to the formulation used. Table 1 presents research variables and summary 
definitions. 
 
THE RESULTS OF A FAMILY OF EMPIRICAL MODELLING FOR 
AUSTRALIAN DATA 
Competitive models in the OLS regression with allocation of charitable organisations 
into similar industry group. The purpose of the grouping is to allow competition effects 
from competitor charities, different organisations with similar missions and 
objectives.The sample of charitable organisations is formed into eight groups. These 
are: All — all organisations combined for comparative purposes (n = 352); Welfare (n= 
119); Humanitarian (n = 42); Global (n = 35); Disability (n = 84); Animal (n = 21); 
Science (and Culture) (n= 28); and Rural (n = 49).   
 
The family of competition model 1 
This paper concentrates on the results of research using Model 1 which combines 
lagged and unlagged independent variables as determining donation. As discussed 
earlier, fundraising expenditures are the cost for fundraising activities for raising 
donations, therefore fundraising expenditures are expected to have a direct effect on 
current collection of donations. Other independent variables take longer to have an 
effect on the current donation, so Model 1 employs fundraising expenditures of the 
current year whereas other independent variables use information from the previous 
year.   
 
Estimation results for each industry group and the coefficients of independent variables 
for each industry group are presented. These results indicate several points: (1) the 
sample of Australian charitable organisations is successfully allocated in an appropriate 
group; (2) the competition models fit well with the groups of charitable organisations; 
(3) most variables in the competition models one are related to total donations; and (4) 
charitable organisations compete within the same group of organisation. The structural 
form of the regression analysis is consistent with a Cournot type model of oligopolistic 
competition.  
 
In Table 2, lnFi is shown as positive elasticity in most of the groups, as expected, except 
Rural. Thus, the coefficients of fundraising expenditures in all groups are the range 
between -0.010 and 10.016. lnFi shows significantly positive correlation in the Global, 
Disability and Science groups. Hypothesis 1 is tested as follows: H0: Fi  0; and H1: Fi 
> 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in most groups; All, Welfare, Humanitarian, 
Global, Disability, Animal and Science groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not 
rejected in the Rural group. The coefficients for lnFj are significantly negative in the 
Global, Disability and Science groups, as expected, while they are positive and 
significant in the Humanitarian industry, and positive but insignificant in the All, 
Welfare, Animal and Rural groups, and the ranges are between -6.094 and 0.607.  
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Hypothesis 2 is tested as: H0: Fj  0 and H1: Fj < 0. The Null Hypothesis is rejected in 
Global, Disability and Science groups, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the 
All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Animal and Rural groups. The regression coefficient on the 
ratio of lnFi to all competitors, lnFi/∑lnF, has mixed results, with significantly positive 
elasticities in All, but insignificant but positive elasticities in the Humanitarian and 
Animal. Those of the Global, Disability and Science groups are negative but significant, 
but show negative and insignificant elasticities in the Welfare and Rural groups. 
Hypothesis 3 is tested as: Hypothesis 3: H0: Fi /F  0 and H1: Fi /F > 0. The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected the All, Humanitarian and Animal groups, whereas the Null 
Hypothesis is not rejected in the Welfare, Global, Disability, Science and Rural groups.   
 
These results indicate that fundraising expenditures have a positive impact on the level 
of total donation in most of groups except in the Rural group. The competitors’ 
fundraising activities impact on donors in the Global, Disability and Science groups to 
donate to competitors by reducing donations to the original organisations. However, 
they increased the level of donations in the Welfare, Humanitarian, Animal and Rural 
groups. Thus, competitors’ fundraising activities may influence donors to increase 
overall support for their own preferred charitable causes especially in the Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Animal and Rural groups.  
 
The coefficient on size (lnAi) is shown to be positive and significant in the Disability 
group, and positive but insignificant in the Welfare, Animal, and Science groups as 
expected, whereas the coefficients in the All, Humanitarian, Global and Rural groups 
are obtained otherwise. Hypothesis 4 is tested as: H0: Ai  0 and H1: Ai > 0: The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in the Welfare, Disability, Animal, and Science groups, while the 
Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global and Rural groups. The 
coefficient on the ratio of size to competitors’ size is positive in the All, Humanitarian, 
Global, Science and Rural groups, while those in the Disability and Animal groups is 
negative but significant, and negative and insignificant in the Welfare group. 
Hypothesis 5 is tested as: H0: Ai /A  0 and H1: Ai /A > 0. The Null Hypothesis is 
rejected in the All, Humanitarian, Global, Science and Rural groups, whereas the Null 
Hypothesis is not rejected in the Welfare, Disability and Animal groups. The above 
results indicate that the size of charitable organisations has a positive impact and 
encourages donors to donate more in the groups of Welfare, Animal and Disability. 
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Table 2: OLS Estimation for a Family of Model 1 
ln Dt = β0 + β1 ln Fit + β2 ln Fjt + β3 (ln Fi/ Σ ln Ft) + β4 ln Ait-1 + β5 (ln Ait-1 / Σ ln At-1) + β6 ln Vit + β7 ln Agei + e 
 
 All Welfare Humanitarian Global Disability Animal Science Rural  
β0 -2.709 -1.266 -4.026 32.919*** 64.777*** 30.224*** 31.845 13.650** 
 (5.658) (2.924) (4.365) (9.789) (16.962) (7.349) (25.291) (6.700) 
lnFi    (β1) 0.116 0.351 0.103 7.502*** 10.016*** 0.020 4.808** -0.010 
 (1.380) (0.356) (0.081) (2.587) (3.044) (0.575) (2.639) (0.576) 
lnFj    (β2) 0.325 0.024 0.607** -2.137*** -6.094*** 0.643 -4.024** 0.027 
 (0.447) (0.228) (0.359) (0.773) (1.516) (0.499) (2.043) (0.489) 
lnFi /ΣlnF (β3) 145.228 -9.597 7.171* -374.576*** -1305.326*** 4.376 -186.955** -6.179 
 (757.196) (64.776) (5.060) (143.195) (400.462) (17.699) (103.03) (55.186) 
lnAi t-1 (β4) -0.686 0.015 -0.484 -1.344 1.856** 0.178 0.387 -1.466* 
 (1.416) (0.183) (0.430) (1.573) (1.178) (0.291) (0.925) (1.064) 
lnAi t-1/ΣlnAt-1 (β5) 382.981 -18.724 82.331 73.543 -275.739** -39.811*** 1.364 92.648 
 (944.701) (41.424) (72.106) (95.283) (174.335) (13.181) (41.849) (105.94) 
lnVi t-1  (β6) 0.679*** 1.116*** 0.771*** 0.245 0.373*** -2.488*** 0.307 1.018*** 
 (0.064) (0.113) (0.066) (0.252) (0.148) (0.859) (0.552) (0.123) 
lnAgei t-1   (β7) 0.143 -0.066 -0.227** -1.188*** 1.678*** -0.060 2.201 -1.099*** 
 (0.112) (0.122) (0.103) (0.294) (0.225) (0.345) (2.164) (0.278) 
R2 0.455 0.570 0.711 0.832 0.610 0.838 0.639 0.785 
Adjusted R2 0.442 0.543 0.684 0.789 0.574 0.751 0.512 0.740 
SE regression 1.319 1.003 0.734 0.521 1.034 0.298 1.117 0.663 
Observations 308 119 42 35 84 21 28 49 
NOTE: Dependent variable is ln of Total Donations (Di), Table 1 presents definition of variables, ***, **,* significant at 1, 5, 10 % 
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The coefficients on Volunteers (lnV) are either significantly positive or positive in all 
groups, significantly positive in the All, Welfare, Humanitarian, Disability and Rural 
groups, and positive but insignificant in the Animal group. Volunteers seem to affect 
and increase the level of total donations in all groups. Hypothesis 6 is tested as: H0: Vi 
 0 and H1: Vi > 0. Thus, the Null Hypothesis is rejected in the All, Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Disability, Rural groups of charitable organisations. Conversely the Null 
Hypothesis is rejected in the Animal group. The coefficient on Age (lnAge) also 
indicated mixed results. It was positive and significant in the Disability and positive but 
insignificant in the All and Science groups, whereas those of the Humanitarian, Global 
and Rural groups are negative but significant, and negative and insignificant in the 
Welfare and Animal groups. Hypothesis 7 is tested as: H0: Agei  0 and H1: Agei > 0. 
The Null hypothesis is rejected in the All, Disability and, Science and Culture groups of 
charitable organisations, while the Null Hypothesis is not rejected in the Humanitarian, 
Global, Welfare, Animal and Rural groups of charitable organisations. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The model was also tested for geographical grouping in 6 States, ACT, Victoria, New 
South Wales (NSW), Queensland (QLD), Western Australia (WA) and South Australia 
(SA). Overall the results with the geographic groups were much weaker than the 
industry group. This is to be expected if donors have an interest in the focus of 
organisations’ charitable activities, rather than their location. Therefore this paper is 
focusing on the factors affecting Industry Groups. 
 
Factors influencing donations in Industry Groups 
The level of volunteers (V) had a significant positive effect on donations in most groups 
except Animal industry in the following year; and Welfare and Rural groups show 
strongest at 1% of significance. This was because volunteers are involved in fundraising 
activities of the charity and many of them can be expected to also donate. Because 
volunteers have insight into how charitable organisations operate, donors might see that 
the more volunteers are involved in the charitable organisations or for a longer time, the 
more they would trust the organisation.  
 
Similar to the effect of volunteers on donation, the organisational size and age also 
showed a positive effect on the total donations. Thus, organisational size (A) had a 
positive effect on donations in Welfare, Disability, Animal and Science groups in the 
following years, whereas organisational age has also a positive effect in All, Disability, 
Science and Rural industry.  
 
Administrative costs (AC) had a negative effect on total donations in All, Global and 
Science groups in Australia and this result was consistent with the previous study which 
found that the more charitable organisations spent on administration, the less it received 
from donors using limited organisational data with much larger donations in US 
(Tinkelman & Mankaney 2007). However, in this thesis in five groups, Welfare, 
Humanitarian, Disability, Animal and Rural, was positive on donations in the following 
year, these results might be affected by the size of donations.  
 
Government grants were not included in Model 1, but when they were included as an 
additional explanatory variable in empirical models (Models 2 and 4), the competing 
organisation’s Fundraising expenditures (Fj) sometimes showed a negative effect on its 
total donations in Welfare and Rural groups in current year. However, in the overall 
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study, Government support (G) showed mixed results, which was consistent with the 
previous studies. In some groups, government grants had a crowded-in effect on total 
donations in the following year, whereas in others, they were crowding-out donations.  
 
The results showed that the more a charitable organisation spent on its fundraising 
expenditures (Fi), the more its total donations increased in the current year in most of 
the Australian charity groups except the Animal group. The results also indicated, as 
expected, that in Global, Disability and Science groups in the current year, the more 
their competing organisations spend on competing fundraising expenditures (Fj), the 
less these charitable organisations raise in total donations.  In addition, the ratio of 
fundraising expenditures to the competitors’ fundraising expenditures in the current year 
had a positive effect on raising donations in all other groups. However, these results 
were not statistically significant and most of these organisations were protected from 
competition to a degree because they received government assistance. The reasons for 
these results are unclear in terms of donor and organisational behaviour.  
 
These results indicated that a sample of each charitable organisation in similar service 
provider groups in Australia carefully watches the major decisions of its rivals and 
would often plan counterstrategies. For example, Red Cross Australia cancelled its 
annual door-knock appeal after the collection of large donations for the Victorian 
Bushfire in 2009. 
 
Summary of Results for Model 1 and its sub-families 
The results of Model 1 family indicate the effectiveness of an organisation’s own 
fundraising activities and the variable effect of their competitors’ activities on their level 
of donations.  Analysis by this Model also demonstrates the positive influence of 
volunteers, size of organisation and administrative costs on the level of funds raised.  
The use of the economic theory should assist charitable organisations and governments 
to understand the context in which the non-profit sector raises funds and the impact of 
competition and other factors.  
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